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Probate law is currently undergoing considerable nationwide
study and change. Many states have recently revised their probate
law.1 The American Bar Association in conjunction with the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
considered drafting a Uniform Probate Code in order to resolve
some of the current problems in administration of estates.2 One of
the basic aims of the reform has been to remedy the waste and
delay caused by inefficient probate procedure. The problem in
Nebraska is a result of the county court, which is the probate
court,3 lacking general and equitable jurisdiction.4  Because the
county court lacks equitable powers, its jurisdiction in probate can-
not be exclusive unless it is allowed to encroach upon the district
court's equity jurisdiction. The result is a shifting of estate prob-
lems between the two courts during administration of the estate.
A further source of delay is that the district court may try de novo
all matters decided in the county court.5 The question to be asked
is whether trial de novo in the district court and concurrent juris-
diction with the county court meet the need in probate procedure
for administrative efficiency.
L HISTORY
The background of the present probate procedure is a running
conflict between the exclusive probate jurisdiction of the county
court and the equitable jurisdiction of the district court. The
recent trend has been to shift more matters of probate6 into the
district court. Under section 24-302,7 the district court has juris-
diction "except where otherwise provided" and it has been argued
that this gives the district court control over all matters not ex-
pressly reserved to the county court.8 For example, the district
1 Lundy, Probate-Law Revision in Oregon, 44 ORE. L. REV. 42, 52-58
(1964). Washington can now be added to this list.
2 Harris, A Uniform Probate Code, 104 TRuSTS & ESTATES 337 (1965).
8 NEB. CoNsT. art. 5, § 16.
4 NEB. CoNsT. art. 5, § 9. The district court is designated as the court
of general and chancery jurisdiction.
5 NFB. REV. STAT. § 30-1606 (Reissue 1964).
6 "Probate" as used here and throughout the article will refer to the
regulation, management and settlement of decedent's estate.
7 NEB. R v. STAT. § 24-302 (Reissue 1964) which complements the consti-
tutional delegation of general and chancery jurisdiction to the district
court.
8 Stubbs, Probate Procedures Available to Beneficiaries, 39 NEB. L. REV.
311, 319 (1960).
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court was permitted to construe a will only if such construction
was incidental to a recognized equity matter, such as where the
action was brought to have a specific bequest declared a lien upon
real estate.9 However, the supreme court has held that the neces-
sity for construction of a will in any suit brings the matter within
the scope of the district court's jurisdiction.' °
During the time period between the two decisions above, there
were no constitutional or statutory changes so the reasons for the
judicial change lie elsewhere. One reason may be the supreme
court's lack of confidence in the lay judges who sit in the county
courts of the sparsely populated counties." A statutory recogni-
tion of this practical limitation in the county courts is the fact that
appeals from the county court are tried de novo in the district
court.1 2 In re Marsh13 involved a suit in which the will contestant
sought to voluntarily dismiss his appeal then pending in district
court. The dismissal was granted by the district court and the
issue was whether the district court had the power to dismiss the
appeal. The procedure for appeals to the district court was set
out in detail by the court quoting from Williams v. Miles1 4 as
follows: "The evidence is taken and the cause tried without regard
to the evidence in the lower court. The result, not the case itself,
is certified back to the county court. After the district court be-
comes so possessed of the case, the county court will never have
9 Klug v. Seegabarth, 98 Neb. 272, 152 N.W. 385 (1915). The suit was
brought by the administrator of the wife's estate against the heirs of
her husband's estate. The bequest was from the husband to the wife
and had not been paid to the wife at her death. The court found that
her bequest was a lien upon the land which had passed in her husband's
will.
10 Lutcavish v. Eaton, 166 Neb. 268, 89 N.W.2d 44 (1958). A beneficiary
under Fred Crane's will objected to the estate of Fred's second wife,
Maude. The beneficiary claimed that the personal property given by
Fred's will to Maude should go to him on Maude's death. As the deter-
mination of the claim required construction of Fred's will, the county
court could not determine the claim against the estate.
11 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-501.01 (Reissue 1964), apparently recognizes this
thought by providing for lawyer judges in counties of over 16,000 pop-
ulation.
12 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 30-1606 (Reissue 1964); 24-544 (Reissue 1964); and
27-1305 (Reissue 1964).
13 145 Neb. 559, 17 N.W.2d 471 (1945). In applying the three statutes in
note 12, supra, the court found that the district court had the power to
deal with the suit as though it had been originally filed in that court.
14 73 Neb. 193, 102 N.W. 482 (1905) reports the fifth of seven appeals of
this case to the supreme court. The court considered on this appeal a
motion for a new trial partly on newly discovered evidence and partly
on the previous action being brought in the wrong court.
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any further jurisdiction of the issues so removed."' 5 Once appeal
is perfected to the district court, the county court judgment is va-
cated. After trial, the district court certifies its decision back to
the county court which then completes the administration of the
estate. Thus, the trial function of the county court is duplicated in
the district court. This delay is not necessary to the proper func-
tion of the probate procedure and should be eliminated.
I. TRENDS IN PROBATE PROCEDURE
Through judicial interpretation of the statutes on probate juris-
diction, two theories have been developed. The first is that the
probate court has the power to decide equity matters where such
matters are incidental to its exclusive probate jurisdiction. The
second theory is that where the matter involved is usually decided
in the district court, the district court can also decide related pro-
bate matters that would otherwise be within the exclusive juris-
diction of the county court. The theories pull in opposite directions,
the former extending the jurisdiction of the county court and the
latter restricting it. And, as will be seen, the supreme court bal-
ances the interests of each court to determine which should prevail.
The first rule was recognized and applied in Williams v. Miles.8
The issue presented in this particular appeal of the Williams case
was whether the county court could hear a petition to set aside a
will after the time for appeal on the judgment approving the will
had run. The petitioners also sought to prove another will. The
supreme court found that where the county court had exclusive
jurisdiction "it may exercise all the powers of a court of general
jurisdiction, either legal or equitable, which pertain to the subject
over which it is given such jurisdiction."'1 The reason for the rule
is simply that the county court should have those powers necessary
to carry into effect its probate jurisdiction and to give complete
relief to the parties before it. In Williams this meant that the
county court could provide the equitable relief of granting a new
trial. The county court has also been held to have jurisdiction of
an action to grant specific performance of an agreement between
heirs in settlement of a will contest' s and of an action to require an
executor to account for the difference between the sale price of
15 145 Neb. 559, 563, 17 N.W.2d 471, 474 (1945).
16 63 Neb. 859, 89 N.W. 451 (1902).
17 Id. at 866, 89 N.W. at 454.
18 In re Estate of Lee, 137 Neb. 567, 290 N.W. 437 (1940). The agreement
here was between a beneficiary under a prior will which was held re-
voked and the residuary beneficiary under the will admitted to probate.
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land he fraudulently sold and the actual value of the land.19 It
remains to be determined, however, when the county court has
such exclusive jurisdiction as to allow it to decide equitable mat-
ters.
The second rule is illustrated in Dennis v. Omaha Nat'l Bank.20
In Dennis the heirs at law of the settlor of the trust brought the
suit in the district court to interpret the will, terminate the trust
and distribute the corpus of the trust. The supreme court held that
although no county court had previously determined heirship,21
"the district court has original jurisdiction to make such deter-
mination where the question becomes material in a proceeding of
which such court has original jurisdiction. '22 The supreme court
thus approved the theory that where there is an equitable question
or similar peg by which the district court obtains original jurisdic-
tion, the district court can decide matters which are otherwise
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the county court. The district
court has jurisdiction when the action is brought to quiet title,23
to partition real estate24 or to settle matters involving trusts.25
The result of these and similar decisions has been to make the pro-
bate jurisdiction of the county court concurrent with the district
court, raising the question of which is the proper court.
19 In re Estate of Jurgensmeier, 142 Neb. 188, 5 N.W.2d 233 (1942). The
executor's fraudulent conveyance was a sale of land in the estate to his
wife for less than the actual value of the land.
20 153 Neb. 865, 46 N.W.2d 606 (1951).
21 State v. O'Conner, 102 Neb. 187, 166 N.W. 556 (1918). The supreme
court held that if the heirship of the parties to a suit in the district
court was disputed, the district court must abate its action until the
county court determines heirship.
22 153 Neb. 865, 870, 46 N.W.2d 606, 611 (1951). The cases cited by the
supreme court to support this point are distinguishable in that in each
case, heirship was undisputed. See discussion in State v. O'Conner,
102 Neb. 187, 166 N.W. 556 (1918).
23 Best v. Gralapp, 69 Neb. 811, 99 N.W. 837 (1903). The case was prop-
erly in the district court where one child of the deceased brought an
action to quiet title against the other children of the deceased because
real estate and title to property were involved. Both of these areas
are within the district court's statutory jurisdiction.
24 Hiatt v. Hiatt, 146 Neb. 652, 20 N.W.2d 921 (1945). The district court
had jurisdiction over the suit because of its exclusive jurisdiction over
land even though the issue presented was whether the debt of one
beneficiary owed to the testator might be retained or charged against
his share from the proceeds of the partition sale.
25 In re Trust Estate of Myers, 151 Neb. 255, 37 N.W.2d 228 (1949). The
trust was created by the county court but the nature of trust questions
requires trial in the district court.
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III. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The concurrent jurisdiction of probate has raised the central
issue of "how far one may get relief in the probate court and
how far he must or may go into the courts of general equity juris-
diction."26 Each of the areas that will be considered-claims against
the estate, settlement and distribution of estates, admission and
construction of wills and determination of heirship2 7-- shows an
aspect of the problem created by the overlap of power under the
statutes and judicial decisions on probate jurisdiction.
The first area to be considered is the county court's jurisdiction
to hear and determine claims and setoffs in the estates of deceased
persons. In the case of In re Wiley's Estate,2 the executor's final
report to the county court omitted certain property because he
claimed title to it. The legatees filed objections to the report al-
leging that the property claimed by the executor should be part
of the estate. The deceased had contracted to sell the land to one
Trumbull. Upon Trumbull's default on the contract, the executor
brought an action for a foreclosure sale on the contract and bought
the land in his own name. He received title to these lands at the
foreclosure sale. The county court could decide title to the land in
question as the supreme court felt that the county court should de-
cide all questions necessary to carry out its probate power.29 But in
Lambie v. Stahl3" the supreme court apparently narrowed the Wiley
rule. In Lambie a legatee objected to the final account of the admin-
istrator and alleged that certain rentals collected by another legatee
should be part of the estate. The supreme court held that the
county court could not decide title to the rentals. The cases are
distinguishable because in Lambie a legatee, and not an executor
as in Wiley, had possession of the property. The court specifically
held that the relationship of the legatee to the estate was not
enough to give the county court control.31 In Graff v. Graff 32 bene-
26 PouND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 140 (1940).
27 NF_. REV. STAT. § 24-504 (Reissue 1964). Each of these areas is detailed
in this statute and is the basis for most of the county court's probate
jurisdiction.
28 150 Neb. 898, 36 N.W.2d 483 (1949).
29 The county court is prohibited both by the constitution, NEB. CoNsT. art.
5, § 16, and by statute, NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-502 (Reissue 1964), from
trying title to real property. However, the equitable conversion of
real property to personal property in a contract for sale of real property
permitted the county court to determine title here. As more wealth
becomes based in personal property, the reasons for this prohibition
are weakened.
30 178 Neb. 506, 134 N.W.2d 86 (1965).
31 The result in Lambie is illustrative of the delay caused by concurrent
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ficiaries of the wife's estate sought to impress a trust upon a note
and mortgage in the possession of the personal representative of
the husband's estate. The supreme court held that "the district
court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies between
the executor and persons claiming adversely to the estate."3 3  In
this area of concurrent jurisdiction the question of just who has
possession of the item of property in dispute apparently determines
which court is the proper court. Such a question seems essentially
irrelevant to the overall job of administering an estate, and should
not determine jurisdiction.
The second problem area is the jurisdiction of actions to re-
quire executors and administrators to settle their accounts and to
account for all the property of the estate that came into their pos-
session. Jurisdiction for this purpose is statutorily vested in the
county court.34 Such accounting, of course, includes a statement
showing the distribution of proceeds of the estate. In Reischick v.
Rieger35 the action was for an order to distribute part of the estate
under authority of a judgment against the executor and to con-
strue a will. The court found that as to both these matters the
district court lacked original jurisdiction. However, in Schick v.
Whitcomb,3 the district court was held to be the proper court to
distribute the proceeds of the estate. The district court obtained
jurisdiction because the action in Schick was for a partition sale of
real estate. The district court is given by statute the power to
handle partition sales.37 The supreme court felt that the district
court should be able to distribute the proceeds of the sale to pro-
tect the interests of all parties. Although this policy may have
been beneficial in this case, especially since certain heirs had re-
ceived advancements on their shares, it did make distribution an-
other probate matter subject to the overlapping powers of two
courts.
The third problem area concerns the county court's jurisdiction
over the probate of wills which involves admitting wills to probate,
jurisdiction. The administrator was ordered to prosecute the claim and
then account to the county court.
82 179 Neb. 345, 138 N.W.2d 644 (1965).
33 179 Neb. 345, 353, 138 N.W.2d 644, 650 (1965). This is quite a change
from the statute which gives to the county court the jurisdiction over
all claims of the estate. It may be explained however, by the fact that
a trust was involved which is within the district court's special compe-
tence.
34 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-504(5) (Reissue 1964).
35 68 Neb. 348, 94 N.W. 156 (1903).
36 68 Neb. 784, 94 N.W. 1023 (1903).
37 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1305 (Reissue 1964).
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construing wills and determination of heirship under wills. An ac-
tion to enjoin the probate of a will cannot be brought in district
court until the county court first determines whether there is a
will.38 However, "unless it appears from the will itself, without
the necessity of applying rules of construction, that a purported
will is completely abortive,"-39 the county court must admit it to
probate. The county court has exclusive jurisdiction to admit a will
to probate but it is without jurisdiction to go beyond the questions
raised by statutory formalities required in execution of a will and
whether the instrument purports to be a will with designated bene-
ficiaries and testamentary dispositions. But the county court can-
not look at the legal effect of a will. In Father Flanagan's Boys'
Home v. Graybill40 the supreme court held that the county court
had "no jurisdiction to construe wills to determine the rights of
devisees or legatees as between themselves, or between the execu-
tors and persons claiming adversely to the estate."41 The executor
can have the county court construe the will for his own guidance
and this generally protects him from liability.42 However, in Hahn
v. Verret,43 the court held, concerning a county court order directing
the executor to collect rents, that the "order was not binding upon
the devisee or legatee as between themselves nor between them-
selves and the executor."44 Although the court said the executor
was protected from liability, this language would indicate that an
executor could be liable for following a county court order.
8 Brown v. Webster, 87 Neb. 788, 128 N.W. 635 (1910). The action was
brought by the widow of the deceased against the special administrator
and the devisees and legatees.
89 Brown v. Applegate, 166 Neb. 432, 436, 89 N.W.2d 233, 236 (1958). This
case involved the objection of the sole heir at law to the county court's
order admitting a will to probate. His objection was that the will made
no valid dispositions, but the supreme court would not consider this
ground until after the will was admitted to probate.
40 178 Neb. 79, 132 N.W.2d 304 (1964). The action was brought for a
declaratory judgment in the district court for a construction of the will
and a determination of the plaintiff's interests as beneficiaries in the
estate. The answering parties' objection to the suit being brought in
district court was denied.
41 178 Neb. 79, 82, 132 N.W.2d 304, 307 (1964).
42 Brownfield v. Edwards, 132 Neb. 325, 271 N.W. 797 (1937). The action
was brought by a devisee against the executor and his bonding com-
pany. Although the executor would have been protected had he waited
until the county court order was final, his earlier distribution and a
subsequent amendment to the decree subjected him to liability.
43 143 Neb. 820, 11 N.W.2d 551 (1943). This action was brought by a
devisee to quiet his title to certain real property.
44 143 Neb. 820, 828, 11 N.W.2d 551, 556 (1943). (Emphasis added.)
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The same lack of power in the county court that exists in ad-
mitting a will to probate and construing a will extends into the
area of determining heirship. The supreme court held, in In re
Trust Estate of Myers,45 that the district court can determine heir-
ship if such determination is incidental to a matter within its spe-
cial competence. The policy reason that governs this entire area
is simply the necessity for the district court, once it has jurisdic-
tion, to make a full and final determination between the parties.
The by-product has been another probate power split between the
two courts.
IV. SOLUTIONS
The following solutions are suggested as possible answers to
the problems which now exist in Nebraska probate procedure.
Probate procedure should permit expeditious handling of the estate
through courts which are easily accessible. There should also be
some procedure available for uncontested estates when speed and
efficiency are paramount values. In any solution, there needs to be
special consideration for lay judges on the county court level and
for the large geographic areas which some district court judges are
forced to serve.
One possible solution is to base Nebraska's system upon the
Illinois trial court system.46 Illinois has one court for all trial work.
In the more populous districts, the trial level court has specialized
with a separate branch handling all probate matters. This system
eliminates questions of which court is the proper one to start in.
It would require the creation of a trial level court either from the
present county or district court. If the county court were chosen,
the question of lay judges would remain to be handled. If the
district court were chosen, the question of one district court judge
in a large geographic area meeting the needs of that area would
have to be met. This solution is gaining favor with many authori-
ties47 and should be considered.
A second possible solution is to give the county courts com-
plete jurisdiction over all matters of probate. The county court
would have to be given complete equity powers in probate matters,
45 151 Neb. 255, 37 N.W.2d 228 (1949). The action involved the proper
administration of a trust, which is a task usually delegated to the dis-
trict court in Nebraska.
46 Mulliken, The Unified Trial Court, 50 ILL. B.J. 668 (1962).
47 Bierman, Probate Jurisdiction-Limitations in Questions of Title-A
Call for Reform, 19 U. MIAMI L. REv. 637 (1965). The author suggests
this type of solution for Florida, which has nearly the same problems in
probate jurisdiction as Nebraska.
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which would require eliminating some of the statutory and consti-
tutional restrictions on their jurisdiction. Trial de novo would be
eliminated to prevent the delay caused by duplication of trials in
the present system. The problem here is the lay bench and the
increased case load on the county courts. This solution does pre-
sent the minimum change needed to correct the existing problems.
A third solution is to transfer the entire probate jurisdiction
to the district courts. In this system, the clerk of the district
court should have the power to handle all uncontested estates and
the ministerial duties connected with the administration of an es-
tate. The clerk would be readily accessible for all necessary filings
and this would mitigate the problems of one district court judge in
a wide geographic area. This would not increase the trial work
load of the district courts since the contested matters are brought
into the district court under the present system. It does not rad-
ically change the present system as it leaves the county court in
existence but without its probate jurisdiction. This system is per-
haps best suited, in this author's opinion, to the special problems
which Nebraska faces.
These solutions are suggested at least for the purposes of creat-
ing discussion among Nebraska lawyers with regard to reform of
the present probate procedure. It is significant that in most of the
states which have reorganized their procedure the bar has initiated
the reform. It is to the credit of the bar when it reforms the
judicial system from within. Increasing public awareness of the
delay and waste inherent in the present probate jurisdictional sys-
tem adds to the need for immediate reform.
Kent E. Person, '68
